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Introduction 
Matters relating to ship borne acts of aggression 
and the security of ships and their crews have 
long been a concern to maritime interests. 
Since the onset of the age of exploration, fleets 
of vessels have fought for control of waterways. 
With the advent of international sea trading 
routes, there came the arrival of marauding 
pirate ships. The technology behind the 
weapons of aggression as well as that behind 
the corresponding tools of awareness and 
avoidance have evolved over the centuries 
since man first took to the oceans on military 
or commercial ventures. For most of this 
time, the element of surprise and the tactical 
advantage this brings has rested firmly with 
the aggressor. The invention and refinement 
in the last century of wireless radio and radar 
technologies offered the tools to communicate 
with and detect vessels of interest beyond 
human line of site. In reality, both of these 
technologies have had a profound effect on 
marine transportation in that each has done 
its part to increase the area of maritime 
domain awareness.
Even with the technological advances of the 
last century, two issues in particular continue
to limit the effectiveness of maritime domain 
awareness.  First is the selectivity and size of 
the zones. Our oceans cover a vast area and 
our ability to provide effective surveillance 
is limited. Even with the best ship and shore 
based technologies, coverage is limited to little 
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more than a hundred nautical miles, often in 
narrow sectors ... Is there really no-one out 
there, or are we just looking in the wrong 
places? A second concern regards the ability 
to positively track and identify vessels of 
interest. In other words, those responsible for 
ship and port security must be confident that 
once a vessel or a target of interest has been 
identified there is a means of maintaining a 
unique file on that target until the vessel either 
docks or ceases to become a vessel of interest. 
This is a particular concern in obstructed and 
congested bodies of water.
Two incidents of maritime terrorism that 
occurred around the time of the September 
11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States 
served to focus the resolve of the maritime 
community to answer the threat of terrorism 
with enhanced maritime security. The first 
incident, the bombing of the USS Cole, 
preceded the events of September 11, 2001, 
and had already served to focus concerns of 
imminent attacks on major maritime assets by 
the time of the attacks in the United States. 
On October 12, 2000, the USS Cole, an 
Arleigh-Burke class Navy destroyer, was on 
a routine refueling stop in the port of Aden, 
Yemen, when a small craft loaded with 
explosives and piloted by two suicide terrorists 
was detonated along side. The resulting 
explosion killed 17 US servicemen, injured 37 
others, and caused $250 million in damage to 
the ship. Nearly two years later, on October 6, 
2002, the French tanker, Limburg, exploded 
off the coast of Yemen with considerable 
environmental damage resulting from the oil 
spill created by the incident. Investigation into 
the incident confirmed fears that the explosion 
was an act of terrorism, allegedly initiated 
again by a small high speed vessel piloted by 
suicide bombers. 
The immediate response in the aftermath 
to these disturbingly similar events was 
the development of a framework by the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
for the creation of the International Ship and 
Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. Measures 
that have been adopted within the ISPS 
code include Regulation 6 that mandates the 
requirement for ship’s safety alert systems, 
introduced in 2004. The ISPS Code also called 
for the adoption of Long Range Identification 
and Tracking (LRIT) as a matter of priority.
A Brief History of LRIT
The IMO was established by convention in 
1948 and first met as an organization in 1959. 
Headquartered in the United Kingdom, it 
operates as a special agency of the United 
Nations and represents 168 member states 
and three associate members. The overall 
mission of the IMO is to develop and maintain 
a regulatory framework governing all aspects 
of shipping engaged in international trade. 
Operating as a series of conventions, IMO 
work falls primarily into three categories: 
safety of life, prevention of marine pollution, 
and liability and compensation. 
When the IMO came into existence, a number 
of important maritime conventions, most 
notably the 1948 Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 
convention and the 1954 International 
Convention on the Prevention of Pollution at 
Sea by Oil, were already in force. IMO was 
given responsibility for the maintenance of 
these and other existing conventions as well 
as the development and adoption of new 
conventions as the need is indentified.
Regulations are developed and amended 
through participation in technical committees 
consisting of expert representatives of member 
states. The drafting, approval, and subsequent 
adoption of a convention can, depending on the 
nature of the work, be a very long and arduous 
process, often spanning several years from 
initial identification to the ultimate adoption 
by IMO. Following adoption by IMO, a 
convention must then be individually approved 
by the member countries before it is observed 
and enforced. Where there is an identified 
requirement to address emergency or otherwise 
high priority circumstances, member states can 
agree to accelerate this process and fast track 
the ratification and adoption of a convention. 
Such is the case we have witnessed in the 
development and adoption of the ISPS code 
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and its subsequent recommendations regarding 
Ship’s Security Alerts and Long Range 
Tracking and Identification of ships.
In May 2006, the IMO Maritime Safety 
Committee adopted Resolution MSC.202(81), 
an amendment to the SOLAS convention, 
enabling contracting governments to undertake 
the long range tracking and identification of 
ships. The information requirements are basic 
and include a ship’s identity, its position, and 
a time and date stamp. On January 7, 2008, 
Regulation 19-1 was brought into force with 
a mandatory compliance date of December 
31, 2008. Resolution MSC.202(81) applies 
to all passenger vessels including high speed 
passenger craft, all cargo ships greater than 
300 GRT, and all Mobile Offshore Drilling 
Units that are engaged in international voyages. 
The capability for LRIT is a mandatory fitment 
on all new vessels built after December 31, 
2008, and upon the event of the first radio 
inspection after December 31, 2008, on 
existing vessels in these classes.
Coincident with the adoption of MSC.202(81),  
the Maritime Safety Committee also adopted 
Resolution MSC.211(81) prescribing 
arrangements for the timely establishment of 
LRIT. This resolution recognized the need 
for an expedited implementation of LRIT. 
Contracting governments to the SOLAS 
convention were asked to advise the Maritime 
Safety Committee of its plans to establish 
national and regional LRIT data centres. As 
well, contracting governments were asked to 
submit proposals regarding the establishment 
of an international LRIT Data Centre and 
Data Exchange. The International LRIT Data 
Centre was to be operational by July 1, 2008, 
with national and regional centres to follow by 
October 1, 2008. 
Figure 1: The IMO Maritime Safety Committee Resolution on LRIT applies to passenger vessels, cargo ships, and Mobile 
Offshore Drilling Units. Here a passenger ferry navigates the waters off Vancouver Island, British Columbia. 
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The International LRIT Data Exchange 
and Data Centre
Subsequent to resolution MSC.211(81), the 
Maritime Safety Committee, in May 2008, 
adopted SC.264(84) accepting a proposal 
from the United States to establish an interim 
international LRIT Data Exchange until such 
time as a permanent International Data Centre 
can be established. This step was essential in 
ensuring that the data exchange capability was 
up and operational at the time of the mandatory 
compliance date of December 31, 2008.
The single most important element of the 
LRIT system architecture is the International 
Data Exchange. Briefly, the International Data 
Exchange is connected to all LRIT data centres 
worldwide, and handles the routing of data 
between national and regional data centres. 
LRIT information is considered critical in 
nature and consequently every step is taken 
to ensure there is no loss or corruption of data 
during the exchange process. All transactions 
between data centres employ a store and 
forward buffer to ensure the integrity of data. 
All LRIT data transactions are maintained in a 
traffic record for a minimum of one year. This 
record of archived data is used primarily as a 
means of record for invoicing and settlement 
between contracting governments and data 
centres. Archived data is also available for 
audit purposes.
The overall functionality of the LRIT network 
is defined by the LRIT distribution plan. The 
first feature of the distribution plan is a listing 
of all entities that are entitled to exchange 
LRIT information. This list includes, of 
course, the international, regional, and national 
data centres and additionally includes all 
contracting governments, search and rescue 
agencies as well as other LRIT data users such 
as application service providers (ASPs) and 
communications service providers (CSPs). 
Figure 3: Coastal ferry entering Oban, Scotland.
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For each contracting government, the LRIT 
distribution plan maintains a profile that 
governs its privileges and preferences for 
operation within the international network. A 
key piece of the profile is the definition of its 
territorial waters in accordance with applicable 
international law. Within these territorial 
limits, the distribution plan maintains a list of 
all ports, facilities, and other destinations under 
the authority of the contracting government 
including a list of locations, by co-ordinates, 
that ships for which LRIT is mandatory may 
enter or proceed to as is appropriate. Not all 
contracting governments may, for defense and 
security or for commercial reasons, wish to 
have information regarding vessels flying its 
flag released to a particular administration. 
Recognizing this reality, the LRIT distribution 
plan makes provision to exclude an authority 
from receiving LRIT information from vessels 
flying under a particular flag.
LRIT information must by its nature be reliable 
safe and secure. The consequences of data 
that are lost, corrupted, or misdirected during 
exchange defeat the primary reason for the 
LRIT program. System security is based on
four guiding principles: authorization, 
authentication, confidentiality, and integrity. 
First, the ability to receive and view specific 
LRIT information should only be granted 
to those so authorized. Second, parties 
exchanging LRIT information require an 
authentication. Third, confidentiality of 
the LRIT information is maintained on the 
application server to ensure that the content is 
not inadvertently disclosed during exchange. 
Finally, the integrity of the information must be 
upheld to ensure that no data has been altered.
LRIT reports are initiated in two ways: 
scheduled reports that are automatically 
transmitted from a vessel and on-demand 
reports that are requested by the data end 
user. Latency is defined as the time elapsed 
between when a LRIT report is either 
automatically transmitted or requested by the 
user and when the report is available to the 
end user. In the case of scheduled reports, the 
maximum acceptable latency is 15 minutes; 
for on-demand reports, the maximum latency 
is 30 minutes. The system performance 
specification stipulates that the maximum 
latency specification be met 99% of the time 
over any month and 95% of the time over any 
24-hour period.
Responsibilities of Contracting 
Governments and Administrations
The Maritime Administration, or simply the 
administration of a contracting government, 
is normally the national department or agency 
that is responsible for the safety of ships, the 
protection of life and property at sea as well 
as being responsible for the enforcement of all 
applicable laws and regulations. This would 
typically be the Coast Guard or the National 
Marine Transportation Agency.
Each maritime administration must first 
establish which national or regional LRIT data 
centre that mandated vessels sailing under its 
flag must report through. For each mandated 
vessel, the administration must provide to its 
LRIT data centre basic information consisting 
of the ship’s name, its IMO number, its radio 
call sign, and its Maritime Mobile Service 
Identity. If a vessel is permanently taken out 
of active service, it is the responsibility of 
the administration to notify the LRIT data 
centre of the details as well as the date and 
time of the change of status. When a vessel is 
transferred or sold to another flag state, it is 
the responsibility of the new administration to 
notify its data centre of the particulars of the 
new vessel. 
Each contracting government must recognize 
and respect the importance of LRIT information 
that it is entitled to receive. First and foremost, 
the information must be used for purposes that 
are consistent with international law. Much 
of the LRIT information that comes into the 
possession of a contracting government is 
commercially sensitive in nature and therefore 
must be protected from unnecessary or 
unauthorized distribution to third parties. In 
circumstances where a contracting government 
has security concerns regarding the release of 
information to another contracting government, 
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it is entitled to stop the distribution of LRIT 
information transmitted from ships that are 
entitled to fly its flag.
Distribution of LRIT information is, under 
most circumstances, based on a user pay 
model. A contracting government is responsible 
for costs associated with acquiring any LRIT
information that it requests and cannot charge
ships for information that they request. Likewise, 
a ship is not responsible for costs associated 
with transmitting LRIT information to its 
home administration. In the event that LRIT 
information is requested by a search and rescue 
organization in relation to the distress of persons 
at sea, this information is provided free of charge.
The requirement for vessels, depending on 
classification, sizes and nature of business, 
to transmit LRIT information is mandated by 
IMO SOLAS Regulation 19-1. Once LRIT 
information is received by the appropriate 
data centre, it is archived and maintained for 
a minimum of one year. During this period, 
contracting governments have authority as 
to when and how to responsibly use long 
range identification and tracking information 
that it is entitled to receive under the terms 
of Regulation 19-1. There are essentially 
three distinct circumstances where a 
contracting government is entitled to receive 
LRIT information for security and traffic 
management applications:
•	 All	mandated	ships	that	are	entitled	to	fly	the		
 flag of the contracting government wherever  
 they are located.
•	 All	mandated	ships	that	intend	to	enter	a	port	 
 or facility that is under the jurisdiction of the  
 contracting government.
•	 All	mandated	ships	that	do	not	intend   
 to enter a port or facility of a contracting  
 government but intend to navigate   
 within 1000 nautical miles of its coast.
Figure 4: Lifting a container from a stack to a ship.
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Vessel Data Reporting 
Care has been taken in the implementation of 
LRIT to ensure that the cost and operational 
burden on ships and ship owners is as little 
as possible. This is perhaps best seen in the 
acceptance of the Inmarsat C and Mini C 
satellite communications services as the first 
communications medium for LRIT. Inmarsat 
C and Mini C are, first and foremost, highly 
reliable and globally available store-and-
forward-type satellite data services. The 
up-front costs for the shipboard terminals 
is relatively low and the service pricing 
model, which is based on the volume of data 
transmitted, is ideally suited to the LRIT 
application where the traffic consists of small 
periodic bursts of data. 
Furthermore, with few exceptions, all ships for 
which LRIT is mandated must also comply 
with the terms of the global maritime distress 
and safety system (GMDSS). Inmarsat C is 
one of a number of common services used to 
meet GMDSS compliance and is consequently 
already available on most vessels that must 
comply with LRIT regulations. Because of the 
near worldwide availability and acceptance 
of Inmarsat C and Mini C, there is a global 
network of communications and applications 
service providers (CSPs and ASPs) that offer 
end-to-end integration and delivery of  
Inmarsat C data services. 
Service providers provide the continuity in the  
network between the vessels and their authorized 
LRIT data centre, provide transaction 
management, and ensure that information 
is stored and routed in a secure accountable 
manner.  To keep reporting costs to an absolute 
minimum, only a minimal information packet 
is transmitted from a vessel over the Inmarsat C 
satellite link. Consequently all that is typically 
transmitted from the ship is its position, the 
time and date that the position was provided, 
and a unique identification number. The service 
provider, through the course of handling the 
information, adds value at a number of points. 
First, the Inmarsat identification number, while 
unique to a vessel, does not in and of itself 
identify that vessel. Consequently the service 
Figure 5: The ISPS Code called for the adoption of Long Range 
Identification and Tracking (LRIT) as a matter of priority. Here a
ship's mast holds communication and location equipment. ISTOCKPHOTO.COM/KIREL
NOT FOR REPRODUCTION
16   The Journal of Ocean Technology • Essays Copyright Journal of Ocean Technology 2009
NOT FOR REPRODUCTION NOT FOR REPRODUCTION
provider will add other information on the 
vessel including the IMO ship’s identification 
number and the plain language name of the 
vessel. The integrity and traceability of LRIT 
information is paramount to achieving the 
objectives of the program. The service provider 
adds additional timestamps to the LRIT 
message at each point as it is routed through 
the network from the point it is retrieved 
from the Inmarsat system until it is ultimately 
delivered to the data user.
A typical Inmarsat C service provider can 
remotely integrate and connect shipboard 
equipment to the LRIT data centre and can 
perform control and configuration of the LRIT 
data transmitted from a ship. For example, 
depending on the nature of operations or the 
waters being sailed through, a ship may be 
required to change the interval of or suspend 
the transmission of LRIT information or to 
transmit information on demand. 
Future Implementation of LRIT
At the initial IMO MSC meeting regarding 
LRIT in May 2006, the need for a timely and 
orderly roll-out of LRIT was recognized. To 
ensure early adoption and reliance on LRIT by 
the maritime community, a communications 
medium was required with the reliability and 
ubiquity to ensure that it would essentially 
be a risk-free element as the service was 
established. Consequently, implementation 
and operation of LRIT to date has relied on 
the Inmarsat C and Mini C services as the 
communications medium for reporting LRIT 
information. However, IMO Resolution 
MSC.263(84), “Revised Performance 
Standards and Functional Requirements for 
the Long Range Identification and Tracking 
of Ships,” does not stipulate specific 
communications service for the vessel to 
shore reporting requirements.  
Figure 6: A container ship entering Swan River, Freemantle Port, Western Australia. Care has been taken in the implementation of LRIT to 
ensure minimal costs for ship owners.
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Another technology that demonstrates 
tremendous potential for the implementation of 
LRIT is the Automatic Identification System 
or AIS. AIS is an IMO regulated, radio based 
data communications system with primary 
applications being maritime safety and 
vessel traffic management. Like LRIT, AIS 
collects and transmits a short message packet 
containing basic information on a vessel. 
As a minimum, this packet would include a 
time tagged position report as well as basic 
information on a vessel and the nature of its 
voyage. Unlike LRIT, AIS in its current form 
is limited in range by the radio technology it 
uses as a medium. Range is normally limited 
to approximately 20 miles for ship to ship 
communications and 40 miles for ship to shore 
communications. Its practical applications are 
therefore limited to coastal navigation and 
approaches to ports and harbours.
While there is no mandatory requirement for 
long range reporting, the AIS performance 
standard does provide an option for long 
range applications. In order to overcome 
the range limitations of the current shore 
based technology and be adopted as a 
option to meet long range identification and 
tracking requirements particularly in the 
case of open ocean traffic, AIS must evolve 
Early in 2009, Iridium 
Satellite LLC announced that 
it had begun certification of 
service providers to offer 
LRIT services over the 
Iridium satellite network. The 
Iridium LRIT performance 
standard is based on the 
Iridium short burst message. 
While Inmarsat C is, in most 
cases, ideally suited to 
the LRIT application, the 
service is offered only over 
a geostationary satellite 
constellation. Geostationary 
satellites are held in a fixed 
location over the equator and 
offer constant coverage of a 
particular area of the earth’s 
surface. The distribution of 
the 11 Inmarsat satellites 
around the globe approximately 36,000 
km above the equator provides continuous 
coverage of the globe between the 70 degrees 
north latitude and 70 degrees south latitude. 
Consequently, while the Inmarsat constellation 
does offer the required capacity and reliability 
over most of the globe, vessels that operate 
north or south of the 70th parallels cannot 
use Inmarsat services to meet their LRIT 
obligations because the areas lie outside of 
the Inmarsat footprint. The Iridium satellite 
constellation, on the other hand, consists of 
66 interlinked low earth orbiting satellites
that move around the earth in polar orbits, 
thereby offering the best coverage in the 
polar regions. 
The European Maritime Safety Agency 
has recently awarded a contract for the 
development and operation of a European 
LRIT Data Centre as well as associated 
ASP and CSP responsibility to the French 
satellite service provider Collecte Localization 
Satellites offering LRIT service over both the 
Inmarsat and Iridium systems. The result will 
be a Data Centre serving in excess of 10,000 
LRIT compliant vessels representing twenty- 
seven EU flag states as well as Iceland and 
Norway. 
Figure 7: Communication and safety equipment onboard a yacht.
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to include satellite based communication. 
As a preliminary step in the acceptance of 
space based AIS as an approved technology 
for LRIT, the Norwegian Defense Research 
Establishment has carried out work to model 
the performance of a space based AIS receiver 
deployed on a low earth orbiting satellite for 
maritime traffic monitoring. 
The probability of detecting AIS targets 
from space and consequently the predicted 
performance of AIS as a means of meeting 
LRIT mandatory requirements is dependent 
on a number of factors. For example, the 
swath width illuminated by the satellite on 
the earth’s surface, the length of time that a 
particular point on the surface is in view of 
the satellite on each overhead pass, and the 
effect of the density and distribution of vessel 
targets are all issues that must be resolved 
before satellite payloads can be specified 
and space based AIS is adopted as a means 
to meet LRIT requirements. Regardless, the 
global implementation of AIS through the 
deployment of infrastructure by flag states and 
the installation of shipboard AIS transponders 
on new and existing vessels continues. When 
satellite based AIS is ultimately approved as a 
means of achieving LRIT, the result will enable 
seamless identification and tracking of vessels 
from the origin of a voyage through to the 
destination essentially anywhere on earth. u 
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